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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE TENURE CONTRACT
OF A PROFESSOR IN A PRIVATE COLLEGE
Felch v. Findlay College, No. 640, Court of Appeals of The Third Appellate
Judicial District of Ohio, Hancock County, June 28, 1963.
The plaintiff, Dr. William E. Felch, was a member of the faculty of
defendant Findlay College, a private non-profit corporation. In October
of 1958, the college issued a memorandum containing tenure regulations.
In August of 1959, Dr. Felch was informed that he had been placed on
tenure under those regulations. The fifth paragraph of the memorandum
contained dismissal provisions, and concluded with the following state-
ment:
Upon completion of the investigation and after consultation with
the Dean of the College, the Division Chairman, and the Depart-
ment Head concerned, and with the approval of the Administra-
tive Council, the President may recommend dismissal to the
Board of Trustees or its Executive Committee.'
On July 20, 1961, without following the above dismissal procedures,
President Wilson announced to Dr. Felch that he had one hour in which
to decide whether to accept a letter of dismissal or to resign. Dr. Felch
denied the charges that had been leveled against him, 2 and accepted a letter
of dismissal. He then notified the Board of Trustees that the dismissal
would be contested. Nevertheless, the Board affirmed the President's
action.
3
Thereafter Dr. Felch instituted the present proceeding seeking to
enjoin Findlay College from effectuating his dismissal. He requested
that the college be ordered to continue his employment as a member of the
faculty, and that the college be ordered to pay him the salary previously
1 Brief for Appellant as Amicus Curiae, p. 16, Felch v. Findlay College, No.
640, Court of Appeals of The Third Appellate Judicial District of Ohio, Hancock
County, June 28, 1963. The record does not indicate the scope of the investigation
which was to have been conducted.
2 It is not apparent from the record the nature of the charges which were made
against Dr. Felch.
3 In affirming the President's dismissal the Board of Trustees declared that by
not requesting a hearing Dr. Felch had waived his right to one. On the other hand,
Dr. Felch contended that while the President might recommend dismissal to the
board, he could not dismiss a faculty member himself. This argument was based on
the words of the memorandum, "the President may recommend dismissal," and was
that the omission of words in the memorandum specfically delegating dismissal au-
thority to the President negated the existence of such authority. The court assumed
without deciding that a binding contract of employment existed between Dr. Felch
and Findlay College, that it contained a covenant that Dr. Felch would not be
dismissed without a hearing, and that Findlay College had breached this contract.
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agreed upon. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant college,
and Dr. Felch appealed. The appellate court noted that the plaintiff's claim
depended on general equitable principles, since there are no Ohio statutes
covering teachers' tenure in private institutions. Then, in accordance with
the generally accepted rule,4 they held that a court of equity will not order
specific performance of an employment contract for personal services, and
affirmed the decision of the trial court.5
Among the reasons stated for the rule are: (1) it is impractical for a
court to supervise the enforcement of a decree for specific performance
of a personal service contract; (2) specific enforcement at the request of the
employer would result in involuntary servitude of the employee; (3) since
the employer cannot receive specific enforcement, lack of mutuality of
remedy prevents the court from granting specific performance to the em-
ployee; and (4) it is futile for a court to attempt to resolve differences be-
tween an employer and an employee when the employment is personal in
nature." Some jurisdictions have held the general rule inapplicable where
the services have a unique and peculiar value on the theory that the em-
ployee is irreplaceable. 7 The court in the instant case held that the unique-
ness exception is not applicable where the action is by the employee rather
than the employer, on the ground that although employees with unique
talents may be found, unique employment positions do not exist.
Finally, the court considered the argument that the provision for a
hearing constituted a negative covenant which could be specifically en-
forced by an injunction against dismissal, regardless of whether or not
the court could specifically order Findlay College to reinstate Dr. Felch.8
The court concluded that while in some instances a negative covenant can
be enforced as an indirect means of specifically enforcing an accompanying
affirmative promise, to do so here would lead to "unjust or harmful"
results.9 In other words, an injunction should not be issued if the affirma-
tive promise is one that for substantial reasons ought not to be specifically
enforced. 10
There are at least three sources of tenure for teachers and professors.
First, the state legislature may enact a statute granting permanency of
employment to any teacher meeting specified requirements." Secondly,
4 See Restatement, Contracts § 379 (1932); Annot., 44 A.L.R. 1443 (1950).
5 Felch v. Findlay College, No. 640, Court of Appeals of The Third Appellate
Judicial District of Ohio, Hancock County, June 28, 1963. A motion to certify the
record was made to the Supreme Court of Ohio, and was approved by that court.
Before the case was heard it was settled and dismissed by agreement of the parties.
6 See generally, Corbin, Contracts § 1204 (2d ed. 1951).
7 Shanks Village Committee Against Rent Increases v. Cary, 197 F2d 212 (2d
Cir. 1952) held that one entitled to a chattel or service of peculiar value may have
specific performance and cannot be forced to seek recompense by way of damages.
s See, e.g., Cincinnati Exhib. Co. v. Marsans, 216 Fed. 269 (E.D. Mo. 1914).
9 See Restatement, Contracts § 380 (1932).
10 See Corbin, Contracts § 1206 (2d ed. 1951).
11 For a discussion of tenure statutes in the public schools see Taylor, "Tenure
for Teachers-A Continuous Struggle," 23 Texas L. Rev. 265 (1945); Kuenzli,
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a state administrative body, such as a board of regents, may promulgate a
ruling granting tenure at the college level.12 Finally, the administration of
a private institution may formulate tenure regulations for its faculty.'
3
The variety of tenure programs is almost as great as the number of
institutions which grant it.' 4
Ohio's Tenure Law'u is illustrative of the tenure regulations which
have been prescribed by state legislatures. The statute provides that
once an elementary or high school teacher has obtained tenure, his contract
shall not be terminated except for "gross inefficiency or immorality; for
willful and persistent violations of reasonable regulations of the board of
education; or for other good and just cause."' 6 A hearing before the board
of education is afforded upon request.
If dismissal occurs after the hearing, the teacher has the right of
appeal to the court of common pleas for the county in which the school is
located. This right has been held not to be the right to a trial de novo,
but the right to review of an appellate nature. As the Ohio Supreme Court
stated in Powell v. Young:
17
It seems to us that the General Assembly intended the appeal pro-
vision... to be confined to a judicial review of the proceedings
of the board of education and to give the court discretion to hold
further hearings to be certain that the proceedings before the board
were legally regular and not arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable
or fraudulent; and that it was not the intention of the General
Assembly to provide a trial "de novo."' s
"Dismissal or Removal of Public School Teachers Under Teachers' Tenure Laws,"
21 Notre Dame Law. 25 (1945). In general, tenure statutes do not apply to
teachers in colleges and universities. Wisconsin does have a statute, Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 37.29 (1937), granting tenure to teachers on the college level.
12 Even if the board has promulgated tenure regulations, there is still a need
to find that the regulations have been incorporated into the teacher's contract. For
cases holding that the institution's bylaws or other rulings as to tenure may become
a part of the contract when the parties bargain with them in mind, see University
of Mississippi v. Deister, 115 Miss. 469, 76 So. 526 (1917); Board of Regents v.
Mudge, 21 Kan. 223 (1878). The importance of the regulations' having been rec-
ognized as more than mere statements of policy is illustrated in Bradley v. New
York Univ., 124 N.Y.S2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 283 App. Div. 671, 127
N.Y.S.2d 845 (1954), mere., 307 N.Y. 620, 120 N.E2d 828, 128 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1954).
13 See, e.g., Cobb v. Howard Univ., 106 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 611 (1939); Thomas v. Catawba College, 248 N.C. 609, 104 S.E.2d 175
(1958); Rhine v. International YMCA College, 339 Mass. 610, 162 N.E2d 56
(1959).
14 See Byse & Toughin, Tenure in American Higher Education: Plans, Practices,
and the Law 9-70 (1959) for a survey of tenure practices in eighty colleges and
universities in California, Illinois, and Pennsylvania.
15 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3319.08-16 (1953).
.16 Ohio Rev. Code § 3319.16 (1953).
37 148 Ohio St. 342, 74 N.E2d 261 (1947).
18 Id. at 349, 74 N.E2d at 265.
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This holding is consistent with the purpose of Ohio's Tenure Law as in-
terpreted in State ex rel Weekley v. Young.'9 In that case the Supreme
Court held that the purpose of the act was not to afford permanence of
employment, but to provide an orderly procedure for termination of em-
ployment contracts. Thus, the court's obligation is not to maintain the
employment relationship, but to insure that it is not terminated for some
cause other than one which is specified in the statute. Discretion is vested
with the school board as to the existence of statutory grounds for dis-
charge, subject only to the limitation that the board must act in good faith.20
As originally enacted Ohio's Tenure Law contained a provision for
damages to a teacher wrongfully dismissed.21 When the statute was sub-
sequently amended, this section was omitted. This raised the question of
sovereign immunity, which retains its vigor in those states which have not
explicitly consented to suit in contract.2 2  Without ever explicitly dis-
cussing the issue, the Ohio Supreme Court has indicated that the doctrine
does not apply under these circumstances. In Poehls v. Young2 3 a writ of
mandamus had been issued commanding the board of education to enter
into a continuing contract with a teacher for the school year 1941-42. She
never received a contract and was not assigned a school. Subsequently
she brought an action for damages for the period. The board of education
was ordered to pay her the amount which she would have received had
the contract been complied with. This amounted to her salary for one
year, since she retired after that period.
The court's willingness to grant damages for a period longer than one
year was explicitly announced in Roller v. Patrick.24  There the board of
education had failed to obey a writ of mandamus ordering it to execute
a continuing contract. The teacher, claiming her right to salary for two
years under a continuing contract with the board, and claiming that she
must be permitted to accept such amount without prejudice to her right to
salary for future years up to retirement age, brought an action for salary
declatory judgment. The court ordered that the board pay the teacher the
amount which she would have received had the continuing contract been
effectuated. As to future payments the court noted:
Where, after the continuing contract is entered into, the teacher
is deprived of a teaching assignment and the salary,... the teacher
may maintain an action . .. for subsequent installments of salary
so long as the contract remains in full force and effect.2
5
Since both Poehls and Roller were decided after the re-enactment of Ohio's
Tenure Law minus the damage provision, it is apparent that in Ohio the
problem of sovereign immunity has been resolved in favor of recovery.
19 141 Ohio St. 260, 47 N.E.2d 776 (1943).
20 Powell v. Young, supra note 17, at 348, 74 N.E2d at 265.
21 Ohio Gen. Code § 7708 (1938).
22 See Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 234, 257-59 (1956).
23 144 Ohio St. 604, 60 N.E.2d 316 (1945).
24 145 Ohio St. 572, 62 N.E.2d 367 (1945).
25 Id. at 579, 62 N.E2d at 370.
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In most state colleges and universities tenure regulations are pro-
mulgated either by the board of regents or by the administration of the
university.26 If the legislature has specifically delegated to the board of
regents the broad power to "hire and fire," any attempt by such body to
limit its own powers with respect to dismissal is generally held void.2 7
The rationale apparently is that just as an administrative body cannot
extend its own powers as defined by the legislature, neither can it limit
them. The leading case on this theory is Gillian v. Board of Regents of
Normal Schools,28 a non-tenure case. Gillian had a contract for services
in the normal school of the city of Milwaukee, and was dismissed without
cause. In denying his request for judgment for the balance of the school
year the court said:
This power of summary removal of a teacher, vested in the board
by statute, is a discretionary power, and its exercise in a given case
cannot be inquired into, or questioned by the courts . . . The
board of regents could make no by-law or contract by which this
power could be bargained away, limited, or restricted.2
9
Although this was a non-tenure case, it has nevertheless been consistently
applied to those situations in which the teacher has tenure.30 Thus in
the tenure situations a provision for a hearing before dismissal, whether
embodied in the constitution of the college and subsequently approved by
the board, or announced as the policy of the school and likewise approved,
is unenforceable if the board has been vested with plenary power by the
legislature.31
Where the legislature has not specifically granted the board complete
power as to employment, it appears that tenure regulations may be en-
forced.32  A satisfactory rationale for this distinction is lacking. If the
legislature has not granted the board complete authority as to dismissals,
it is doubtful that the legislature has delegated authority to the board to
limit an authority which it has never possessed. Nevertheless, the courts
have granted relief without attempting to justify the proposition.
For example, in State ex rel Keeney v. Ayers,33 the tenure regulations
26 Byse & Toughin, supra note 14.
27 Hyslop v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Idaho, 23 Idaho 341, 129 Pac. 1073
(1913); Devol v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Arizona, 6 Ariz. 259, 56 Pac. 737
(1899). Contra, Board of Regents v. Mudge, 21 Kan. 223 (1878) ; Board of Educ. of
City of Ottawa v. Cook, 3 Kan. App. 269, 45 Pac. 119 (1896).
28 88 Wis. 7, 58 N.W. 1042 (1894).
29 Id. at 13, 58 N.W. at 1044.
30 See, e.g., Posin v. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 86 N.W.2d 31 (N.D. 1957);
Worzella v. Board of Regents of Educ., 77 S.D. 447, 93 N.W2d 411 (1958); State
ex rel. Wattawa v. Manitowoc Public Library Bd., 255 Wis. 492, 39.N.W2d 359
(1949).
31 Cases cited note 30, supra.
32 Abraham v. Sims, 2 Cal. 2d 698, 42 P.2d 1029 (1935); State ex rel. Phillips
v. Ford, 116 Mont. 190, 151 P.2d 171 (1944).
33 108 Mont. 547, 92 P.2d 306 (1939).
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of the Montana State Board of Education provided that reappointment of
a professor at a state university after three years of service would be
deemed a permanent appointment. They further provided that once having
received such an appointment a professor was entitled to a hearing prior
to dismissal. Professor Keeney was employed as a professor of library
science for six consecutive years under six annual contracts. The tenure
regulations were printed on the reverse side of each of the contracts.
However, the provisions were crossed out in the sixth contract. At the
conclusion of the school year the university notified Professor Keeney
that he would not be reappointed for the succeeding year. No charges
had been filed, no investigation made, and no hearing had been held. The
court held that the regulations became part of his contract with the uni-
versity and that having once achieved tenure status he did not waive it
by signing a contract from which the tenure provisions had been deleted.
The court then ordered his reinstatement.
Under similar circumstances, the court in Richardson v. Board of
Regents of University of Nevada34 not only found that the tenure pro-
visions of the Board of Regents were enforceable, but also held that the
charges were not sufficiently serious to warrant dismissal. Thus the
requirement that dismissal of a staff member under tenure should be only
for "cause" was given legal significance. It should be observed that tenure
provided by administrative fiat was enforced procedurally in Keeney and
substantively in Richardson. In Keeney the court found that the orderly
procedure for dismissal as prescribed in the tenure regulations was not
observed. Consequently, it ordered reinstatement. In Richardson the
required hearing was held, and the issue before the court was the suffi-
ciency of the cause for which the hearing board dismissed Professor Rich-
ardson. In holding that "cause" meant "legal cause" and not any cause
which the hearing board might deem sufficient, the court insured that the
college could not negate the tenure contract by holding a sham hearing
before dismissal. It should be noted that if the teachers in these cases
had requested damages instead of reinstatement, the concept of sovereign
immunity, discussed previously with respect to Ohio, might well have
prevented such an award.3 5
Enforcement of the tenure provisions of private institutions has been
virtually non-existent. In refusing enforcement the courts have either held
the act of the institution in making the tenure contract to be ultra vires,36
or have denied relief on the ground that it is beyond the power of a court
of equity to order specific performance of a contract for personal services.
37
34 70 Nev. 144, 261 P.2d 515 (1953).
35 See Note, supra note 22. Contra, Trustees of State Normal School v. Wight-
man, 93 Colo. 399, 25 P.2d 193 (1933) ; Colorado School of Mines v. Neighbors, 119
Colo. 399, 203 P2d 904 (1949).
36 Cobb v. Howard Univ., supra note 13.
37 Generally on injunction against the discharge of an employee see Annot.,
44 A.L.R. 1443 (1926); Annot., 135 A.L.R. 279 (1941); Restatement, Contracts
§ 379 (1932).
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Queen ex rel Wray v. Governor of The Darlington Free Grammar Schoop8
is the much quoted source of the ultra vires theory. There the letters
patent gave the governors of the Darlington School the power to remove
a teacher or schoolmaster "according to their sound discretion." The
governors issued a bylaw limiting this power. It provided that teachers
were to be removed only on proved charges, and were to be heard in their
own defense. A teacher was removed without charges. He brought an
action in mandamus against the governor of the school. Lord Denam, in
refusing the writ, held that "nothing can be better established than that a
bylaw by a corporation which alters the constitution of the corporation,
is void; and up the same principle a bylaw which restrains and limits the
powers originally given to the governors . . . we think must be bad." 39
Even more difficult to circumvent is the reluctance of a court of equity
to order specific performance of a contract for personal service.40 Oppo-
nents of the rule argue that since the teacher, knowing full well the hostility
of the school, has requested reinstatement, the court need not concern
itself with the cordiality of the relationship upon reinstatement. This
ignores the court's obligation to enforce its decree. The court must con-
sider the working conditions of the teacher, for otherwise the school could
effectively nullify the decree. The teacher is not just asking to be rein-
stated. He is asking to be reinstated on the same terms, with the same
fringe benefits, and the same opportunity for advancement as if the con-
tract had never been breached. Otherwise, tenure would be meaningless.
In an academic environment where much depends on the interplay of per-
sonalities, it could be difficult for a court to determine whether the contract
was being effectively performed. Furthermore, a tenure contract is of
indefinite duration. The court could be forced to retain a case on the
docket for years after its decision. Assuming that one of the parties
is dissatisfied with the employment relationship upon reinstatement, the
court might have to resolve innumerable disputes concerning whether the
terms of the contract were being substantially complied with.
Even though there is no direct precedent for it, it appears that a tenured
teacher in a private institution does have a chance of obtaining damages
for the breach of his employment contract. In Thomas v. Catawba
College,41 a professor had achieved continuous employment status. The
bylaws of the institution provided that tenure at the college would be
governed by the principles outlined in the Statement of Tenure adopted
by the American Association of University Professors, 42 and approved by
38 6 Q.B. 682, 115 Eng. Rep. 257.
39 Id. at 701, 115 Eng. Rep. at 271.
40 Contracts of a close personal nature have, however, been specifically enforced
upon the request of a party suing to enforce an arbitration award. See In the
Matter of Staklinski & Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188
N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959), discussed in Notes, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 140 (1960); 45 Cornell
L.Q. 580 (1960); 55 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 615 (1960); 7 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 507 (1960).
41 Supra note 13.
42 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in 44
Am. A. of University Professors Bull. 290, 291-92 (1958).
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the Association of American Colleges. The professor was provided with a
hearing as specified in the statement. The committee determined that the
charges were valid, and the board of trustees terminated his contract.
Simultaneously, they notified him that in accordance with their tenure
policy his salary would be continued for one year from the date of notice.
More than a year later the professor, asserting that the discharge was
without adequate cause, brought an action asking for recovery of all unpaid
salary. The court first considered what would be the proper measure of
damages for a wrongful discharge of a faculty member. They stated that
the measure of damages would be the actual loss sustained on account of
the breach, and that the maximum amount recoverable would be the dif-
ference between the agreed compensation and the amount the professor
could have earned elsewhere by exercising reasonable diligence. Never-
theless, the court refused Professor Thomas's request on the ground
that in accepting salary payments after his dismissal he had elected his
remedy, and was not thereafter entitled to maintain an action for wrongful
discharge. On this basis the court found it unnecessary to consider
whether there was adequate cause for dismissal. Though the court denied
recovery, their discussion of the proper measure of damages indicated
a willingness to allow recovery in some situations.
Having considered the legal status of tenure, it is advisable to ask
whether tenure is desirable.43 Certainly tenure is one method of preventing
arbitrary dismissals. It enables a professor or teacher to exercise freedom
of speech within a classroom and in his personal life without fear of arbi-
trary retaliation.44 Arguably, tenure is the guardian of academic freedom,
and academic freedom is the prerequisite to that full discussion of ideas to
which our society is committed. Further, tenure insures that a teacher's
classroom performance will be appraised impartially. This is important
because of the variety of pedagogy, and the difficulty in evaluating the
effectiveness of a particular teacher's efforts.
On the other hand, tenure may erode the intellectual atmosphere that
it purports to protect. Schools may be forced to retain incompetent teach-
ers whose conduct is close to, but not quite, just cause for dismissal. Also,
tenure may attract security seekers, and it is arguable that they are less
likely to be pioneers in scholarship than their more fearless brethren.
If tenure is to be more valuable than destructive, just cause for dis-
missal must be emphasized in drafting and enforcing tenure provisions.
A satisfactory method of providing for this is obtained by Ohio's Tenure
Law.45 Cause is emphasized not only by providing that there must be a
hearing before dismissal but also by affording judicial review of the de-
termination of the hearing committee. Likewise, the Richardson court in
43 For a discussion justifying tenure see Stene, "Bases of Academic Tenure,"
41 Am. A. of University Professors Bull. 584 (1955). Contra, Davis, "Enforcing
Academic Tenure: Reflections and Suggestions," 1961 Wis. L. Rev. 200 (1961).
44 See Emerson & Haber, "Academic Freedom of the Faculty Member As
Citizen," 28 Law & Contemp. Prob. 525 (1963).
45 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3319.08-16 (1953).
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exercising judicial review of the proceeding of the Nevada Board of Re-
gents, recognized the importance of just cause.
The courts most often overlook just cause when considering whether
or not they should enforce the tenure regulations of private institutions.
Instead, their emphasis is placed on the nature of the relief requested.
Thus, in the instant case the court did not consider whether there was
cause for Dr. Felch's dismissal, and it is uncertain that it would have been
advisable for it to do so. The contract contained a provision for a hearing
before a body composed of Dr. Felch's professional associates. Presum-
ably they would have been more qualified than a court to determine aca-
demic competence. Nevertheless, cause should mean legal cause, and not
any cause which the hearing body might deem sufficient.46 Therefore,
standards of fairness would seem to require the court to exercise its power
of judicial review to ascertain if there is sufficient evidence of cause for
dismissal. This would, at the very least, insure against a kangaroo hearing
and impose upon the school administration a duty to act in good faith.
Although not requested in the instant case, should the court have
exercised its equitable powers and ordered a hearing for Dr. Felch? This
would seem to be the most practical solution, and would closely parallel
the procedure presently employed by appellate courts when they remand a
case to the trial court for further proceedings. Such relief would not be
subject to the basic criticism of a direct order of reinstatement, namely,
that the college would be forced to retain an allegedly incompetent profes-
sor. If, on remand, the hearing committee found the charges to be war-
ranted, the dismissal of Dr. Felch would be effective, subject only to the
possibility of judicial review of the committee's determination, as dis-
cussed above.47 Dr. Felch would then have received the benefit of tenure,
which is continuous employment except for cause.
Assuming that the hearing body found the charges to have been un-
warranted, one of two things could happen. Since the court would
not have ordered specific enforcement of the contract as to employment,
but only as to a hearing, the college could dismiss Dr. Felch without
being in contempt of court. If Dr. Felch appealed to the court, the
policy argument against ordering a college to pay damages for dismissing
a man whose degree of competence neither the court nor the hearing body
of the college had determined, would be inapplicable. Thus a court
would seemingly be justified in awarding damages. Furthermore, with
his name cleared, Dr. Felch would have less difficulty obtaining another
position. This would alleviate the need for a large sum in damages.
Alternatively, the college might decide to retain Dr. Felch. The
court in the instant case viewed this possibility as indirect enforcement
by them of specific performance of the contract, so an injunction against
a dismissal that was not in conformity with the tenure hearing provisions
46 See Richardson v. Board of Regents, supra note 34, at 144, 261 P2d at 515.
47 If the court found the hearing to be a sham, the college would seemingly be
subject to contempt of court. In addition, the court might then choose to hear the
case as to cause de novo or order another hearing, with provision for damages.
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was refused. However, there is a substantial distinction between the
college's choice of reinstatement after a hearing and reinstatement upon
order of the court. The court having ordered a hearing and not reinstate-
ment would have no duty to supervise the reappointment of Dr. Felch.
Moreover, since the college would chose to retain him, presumptively the
employment relationship would be satisfactory.
The above suggestion, if followed, would not necessarily result in
one of the more important objectives of tenure, that is, permanence of
employment at a given institution. However, it would insure that Dr.
Felch would not have to seek another position while under the stigma
of unresolved charges. In this sense it would result in permanence of
employment in academic circles.
